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Abstract
The Guitar Hero series of video games and their spin-offs have provided millions with a
new way to interact with music. These games are not only culturally significant but also
philosophically significant. Based on the way that these games allow people to interact
with music we must decide that either playing a song in one of these games can be a
legitimate performance of that song or that our current accounts of performance are
inadequate.
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1. Introduction[1]
Jack does not know how to play the guitar. Moreover, Jack hasn’t a clue how to read
sheet music or even tablature. Yet every night, after work, he spends an hour or so
performing classics by the likes of Stevie Ray Vaughan, The Rolling Stones, and Blue
Öyster Cult. Jack plays Guitar Hero.
If retail sales are any indication of cultural significance, then the Guitar Hero video game
series and its spin-off series Rock Band represent a cultural phenomenon. [2] Indeed,
TIME Magazine listed the creators of Guitar Hero and Rock Band among the world’s 100
most influential people of 2008. [3] So, it seems, Rock Band and the Guitar Hero series
are worth discussing. Moreover, we believe, they are worth discussing philosophically.
The key issue we are seeking to address in this paper is whether the purported
performance of a song in a game like Guitar Hero or Rock Band is truly a performance of
the song in question. Without thinking too hard about the matter, one can come up with
clear cases of performance and clear cases of non-performance. A musician playing a
song perfectly, note for specified note, under ideal circumstances and on the instrument
intended by the composer would constitute a clear example of a performance of that
song. Conversely, merely hitting “play” on a CD player will almost certainly qualify as a
non-performance of the song. Playing such games as Guitar Hero and Rock Band,
however, fall neatly into neither extreme. On an obvious level, unlike the clear cases of
performance, players of Guitar Hero do not play real guitars, but rather play non-
stringed, guitar-shaped controller-instruments. Moreover, the music heard does not
issue directly from the controllers but from the game disk and console as controlled by
the player. However, unlike simply pressing “play” on a CD player, game players are
involved in sustained and complex manipulation of an instrument (if we might be allowed
to refer to the controllers as such) in order to bring about an accurate and complete
rendering of the song. Although on this continuum from clear cases of performance to
clear cases of non-performance, it may well be impossible to determine an absolute
dividing line, it is our contention that at least some instances of playing such games as
Guitar Hero and Rock Band will qualify as genuine performances of the songs in question.
We believe that the question will revolve primarily around metaphysical issues in musical
performance for which the philosophical literature is extensive. In this paper, we will
focus primarily on the views developed by Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson, which
we take to be among the most robust and well developed, and generally represent the
standard views on performance. In Section II, we will briefly outline the mechanics of
play in such games as Guitar Hero and Rock Band. Section III outlines some ontological
distinctions posed by Davies and challenged by Andrew Kania concerning the nature of
rock music. Section IV addresses some of the standard issues relating to performance
but which do not seem to result in issues peculiar to video games. Section V focuses on
the particular issue of intentions, Section VI on issues of instrument specificity, and
Section VII on Stephen Davies’ problem of “music-minus-one” recordings.
Figure 1: Schematic of Guitar Hero game controller
Figure 2: Schematic of Guitar Hero graphic display
2. Game Play
Guitar Hero is a rhythm-based video game in which players use a stylized guitar-shaped
controller (see Fig. 1) in concert with dynamic on-screen display (see Fig. 2). The game
approximates guitar play, with manipulation of button combinations intended to roughly
simulate the fingering of notes and chords on a real guitar. From a catalog of dozens of
songs, [4] players select a song for play, and key buttons on the controller according to
the timing of colored markers depicted on screen as moving along the graphic
representation of a guitar neck in time with the audio track for the song played by the
game console. The colored markers on screen correspond to colored fret buttons on the
guitar controller and to notes and chords in the song being played. Players must hold the
appropriate fret buttons and hit the controller’s strum bar in time with the song notes as
indicated on-screen to score points. The controller’s whammy bar can be used during
sustained notes, allowing the player to accumulate even more points. If a player hits the
incorrect button (“plays” the wrong note), or the correct button outside the window of
time allowed by the game, a discordant noise sounds and no points are scored. If the
player accrues too many errors, or fails to play the notes, the song ends. Guitar Hero
has three levels; the higher the level, the more complex the chords and the faster the
play.
With Rock Band, players have the additional option of playing the drums and singing.
Like the guitar controller, the Rock Band drum kit is played according to colored markers
indicated on screen in time with music. Using drumsticks, the drum kit is played very
much like real drums, with a few minor modifications: one drum represents an open high
hat, and another a closed high hat, rather than the player using a pedal to open and
close the high hat as with real drums. Additionally, the force with which the Rock Band
drums are played has no impact on game play.
The singing option of Rock Band uses a microphone allowing the game to detect pitch as
well as to distinguish the player’s vocalization of consonants from vowels. Although the
player’s singing is not amplified by the microphone, if the player does not sing in an
appropriate way, the game does not play the vocal audio track for the song. [5]
3. Some Ontological Distinctions
Before moving on to particular problems of performance, let us take a moment to
consider a pertinent issue concerning the ontology of rock music, given that such games
as Guitar Hero and Rock Band center almost exclusively on the genre. In Musical Works
and Performances, Stephen Davies makes an ontological distinction between works
created for live performance and those created for studio performance, and a further
distinction between these and works created solely for playback, and not for performance
at all. Roughly, works created for live performance (as historically is the case with most
classical music) involves simply the playing of instruments and/or vocalization. On the
other end of the continuum, works created for playback simply tend not to be
instantiable except through recorded means. For example, Throbbing Gristle’s “The
Second Annual Report” (1977) or Faust’s eponymous recording (1971) simply could not
be played live—their means of creation defy performance as such; they are electronic
from the ground-up. And since we do not want to call the mere playing of a disk or MP3
file a performance, these works cannot be performed. Davies classifies most rock music
as belonging to the median category of works-for-studio-performance. Works so
intended tend to involve greater or lesser degrees of studio manipulation, whether this
involves the use of multiple tracks, voice overlay, or other such products of technological
intervention and production. As such, Davies notes, “the technology of the recording
process makes an essential contribution to the work’s properties, so it cannot usually be
played live.” [6]
It should be noted, however, that much seems to hang on the use of “usually” in the
above statement. Although Davies is making an ontological distinction between works-
for-live-performance and works-for-studio-performance, he is not saying that those
falling into the latter category cannot be performed live, but that such can become a
difficult matter. He notes:
As much as possible of the technology of the studio is exported to the live
venue and the signals passed to loudspeakers are mixed and filtered by
technicians and producers. Extensive use is made of synthesizers and of
pre-sampled sound sequences. Even then, the attempt to play works for
studio performance under real-time circumstances often results in an
outcome that is seriously impoverished in sound quality and detail according
to the standards of the type. […] The playing is acceptable as a
performance of its target piece only because it trades on its relation to the
type of rendition that provides the paradigm, which is one relying on the
studio’s technology. [7]
Works created for studio performance tend to be, in Davies’ terminology, ontologically
“thick,” requiring adherence to finely specified instruction communicated either via
musical notation or an exemplar performance and allowing for relatively little variance
compared with ontologically “thin” songs typified more in folk, jazz, and other genres.
Andrew Kania, for one, takes issue with Davies’ distinction between works-for-live-
performance and works-for-studio-performance as being of a genuine ontological kind.
Kania notes, “Any account of rock music that makes live concerts an unusual
phenomenon is surely misguided.” [8] Kania notes, for instance, that many rock
musicians, even today, begin by playing small venues, and as such write songs for live
performance, not primarily for studio performance. However, Kania argues that live rock
performances do “look to” recordings in an attempt to capture what has been polished in
the studio (being in form essentially the inverse of the tradition of classical music, where
recordings tend to be modeled after live performances).
Kania argues that we refer improperly to that which goes into a standard rock recording
as a “performance” for, even as Davies notes, what is captured in such a recording tends
to be not a performance at all but more of a Frankensteining of multiple performance-
parts, smoothed-out and manipulated by sound engineers and producers. Kania chooses
to instead refer to such recordings as “tracks”. It is these, Kania contends, that are
ontologically thick and form the cultural center of the rock tradition. However, they are
not, Kania maintains, performances at all, but rather (following Ted Gracyk)
“manifestations” of ontologically thin songs. Rejecting Davies’ central dichotomy between
works-for-live-performance and works-for-studio-performance, Kania contends that rock
songs may be equally manifested in both tracks and performances. [9]
Manifesting a work, Kania suggests, is to be distinguished from instantiating the work.
One can manifest a musical work without performing it, but one cannot instantiate the
work without performing it. He says, “A manifestation of a work represents the work,
displaying many of its properties, without necessarily being an instance of it.” [10]
Analogously, Kania suggests that a photograph of the Mona Lisa may manifest the work
but will not instantiate it. To qualify as a manifestation, as such, requires substantially
less than does instantiation. [11]
On Kania’s view, a work of rock music may be manifested either through a recording or
“track” or through live performance. In the latter case, the work may have been
instantiated; in the former case, not. On Kania’s view, when the piece in question is one
of rock music, playing Guitar Hero may certainly result in a manifestation of it, but the
recording itself which is sounded in playing the game was already such a manifestation
(so perhaps it is a manifestation of a manifestation or an instance of a manifestation).
However, as Kania does not present any new criteria for what will qualify as a
performance of the work, resorting instead to standard accounts of performance, his
overall distinction discussed here should make no great difference to what is discussed
below.
Davies and others like Jerrold Levinson are concerned with the ontology of music,
including the ontology of works and the relation of performances to the works
purportedly being performed. Kania is centrally concerned with the ontology of rock as
distinguished from other kinds of music but not with issues of performance per se. We
are concerned in this paper with the nature of performance and not with the larger issue
of the ontology of the works being performed. At least on the accounts being considered,
the nature of the work (whether, say, it is ontologically “thin” or ontologically “thick”)
makes no great difference in most cases to whether some activity counts as a
performance of it. How rock music is ontologically different from other kinds of music is
an interesting question and one certainly worthy of continued discussion, but it is not the
question we are seeking to answer here. The performance of some songs, such as
“Happy Birthday,” may require no more than singing the right words in the right order
with rough adherence to an established melody, and this may be because the songs are
ontologically “thin.” This, however, will not be the case with most songs associated with
Guitar Hero and Rock Band, which are most certainly ontologically “thick,” and these are
the sorts of works with which we are concerned in this paper.
4. Some Initial Performance Issues
(4a) Performances require sonic similarity
At the very least, a musical work is individuated as a sonic structure. As such, a standard
claim regarding performances is that, to qualify as such, the purported performance
must possess an appropriate level of sonic similarity to the composer’s creation. The
degree of such similarity as required is a matter of some debate, with positions ranging
from that of Nelson Goodman, who requires absolute, note-for-note compliance, to those
of Jerrold Levinson, Stephen Davies and others, who maintain less stringent (if fuzzier)
requirements.
On Levinson’s view, when a performer makes some error in playing a song, he cannot
properly be said to have instantiated the work, as this requires strict adherence to the
composer’s creation. [12] However, depending on the quantity or perhaps quality of
error, we may still want to say the musician has performed the work. If he succeeds at
instantiating the song to some “reasonable degree,” we want to say he has actually
performed the song, even if this performance is a flawed one. [13] What will determine
the line of “reasonable degree” between poor performance and non-performance,
Levinson suggests, is whether an informed and sensible listener could grasp which song
was being attempted. [14] Davies agrees and contends that it is likely the informed and
sensible listener will be able to identify such errors as errors. [15] He argues, “What is
necessary for performance is a degree of matching; enough, that is, to allow the listener
to make out the work, however dimly.” [16]
The issue of sonic similarity does not thus present a special challenge for such games as
Guitar Hero and Rock Band. When played without error, a Guitar Hero or Rock Band
performance will be sonically identical with a recording of the song, as what the listener
will hear is a recording of the song. Errors in playing will result in the same degree of
sonic dissimilarity to the original work as would playing the song on a real guitar: when
the player hits the wrong fret button at the wrong time, a discordant note is sounded. As
such, wherever the dividing line is to be found between performance and non-
performance on the basis of sonic similarity for performers using real guitars, there too
will be the line for performers using these games.
(4b) Performances require a robust causal connection
As with any work capable of multiple instantiation, it seems it is not enough that some
instance (performance or otherwise) be similar or even identical to the original artist’s
creation. Rather, for some thing to qualify as an instance of some work, not only must
the thing possess the properties constitutive of the work; it must possess them because
they are properties constitutive of the work. In the case of musical performance, then,
for some event to qualify as a performance of some given composition, the sonic
structure of the event must be (at least substantially, allowing for error) the way it is
because this is the sonic structure constitutive of the work in question. [17] That is, over
and above sonic similarity, there must exist some robust causal connection between the
work and some event for that event to qualify as a performance of the work.
Davies remarks:
The matching that is the goal of performance should not arise by a fluke. It
should depend on an unbroken chain of connections that leads from the
sounds made to the performer’s actions and intentions, from these to the
notation in front of her, and from that via accurate copying processes to the
score written by the composer. This new condition requires a robust causal
chain linking the work specified by the composer to the sound event
produced by the performer, so the match between the two depends on their
systematic and intimate connection. [18]
(Alternatively, Davies offers, the composer’s instructions may be communicated by way
of an exemplar or “model”—which may be a recording or itself a performance. [19]) As
such, on Davies’ view, not only must the sonic structure of the performance match the
original composition (to some reasonable degree); it must follow it. Thus stated, the
required causal connection between the structure of the composition and the sounds
made in some event proves no impediment to Guitar Hero and Rock Band performances
being performances of the songs in question. The recordings of songs encoded in the
game are the way they are at least in part because the original compositions are the way
they are. And as a correctly played instance of the game will simply result in a sounding
of the recording, the causal connection is maintained. The sounds heard in such an event
are the way they are (in part) because the music so recorded is the way it is, and this
(in part) because the original composition is the way it is.
However, on the letter of Davies’ claim, Guitar Hero and Rock Band performers face a
further problem. As Davies describes it, the chain of connections in a legitimate
performance should proceed downward from the performed sounds to the performer’s
actions and intentions, from these to the musical notation, and from this to the
composer’s score (or, taking the place of notation and score, a model). And this simple
chain does not describe the causal connections in Guitar Hero and Rock Band game-play.
The chain of connections in a game like Guitar Hero is more complex than in a standard
case of performance. While the sounds recorded on the game disk link downward to the
studio band’s actions and intentions, and these either to musical notation based upon the
composer’s original score or to a model, the musical notation or model also links
upwards to the on-screen notation followed by the game player, and from here to the
player’s actions and intentions. The final result—the performed sounds—links downward
to both the player’s actions and intentions, and the performed/recorded sounds on the
game disk.
As such, on the face of it, Guitar Hero violates Davies’ understanding of the requisite
causal chain. However, this is only the case if we take Davies to be describing a
necessary chain rather than some particular sufficient one, and surely the latter is the
case. We do not think, for example, that Davies believes that a musician who plays from
memory (whether gained from notation or model) and not directly from sheet music has
thus broken the requisite causal chain. Rather, he has merely added a link to the chain—
one that nevertheless maintains the necessary overall connection from the composer’s
score to the performed sounds. Likewise, a musician who employs a sort of musical
shorthand based on standard notation, and plays from this rather than directly from
sheet music, seemingly maintains the overall requisite chain, provided the performed
sounds match and are the way they are because the composer’s score is the way it is.
What seems critical is that there are no breaks between the first link and the last, and
not how many links connect them.
The chain of connections in a Guitar Hero performance is certainly more complex than
the standard chain Davies describes. But as it maintains the high-level link between the
work specified by the composer and the sound event produced by the performer, when
played without error, a Guitar Hero performance undoubtedly fulfills this requirement of
legitimate performances. Putting the matter in counterfactual terms, had the player not
hit the appropriate fret buttons with the correct timing, there would have been no
performance of the song.
Of course, for an event to qualify as a performance of some given work, more is required
than sonic similarity and a robust causal connection to the work. If these were all that
were required of a performance, then playing a CD of the work would equally qualify.
(4c) Performances must allow for variation
It may be argued that, unlike playing a CD, performance is an essentially creative
activity. That is, it is not the mere mechanical sonic realization of some given work but
rather allows for personal input from the performer in bringing the work to life. In other
words, performance must allow for variation on the part of the performer. In performing
some work, the ordinary musical performer typically has open to him three sorts of
variation from the specifications for performing the work: (1) unintentional errors; (2)
intended variance from the composer’s creation; and (3) interpretive variance within the
bounds of the composer’s creation.
In playing Guitar Hero or Rock Band, one can certainly make errors, resulting in the
sounding of discordant noise. Opportunities for intended variance from the composer’s
creation, however, are more limited. A player can choose to hit some fret button or
buttons other than those in line with the note or chord specified by the game notation,
but this will only result in the sounding of the same discordant noise as that made in
unintentional errors. Opportunities for interpretive variance are also limited. Specifically,
the player can use the controller’s whammy bar during play of sustained notes to alter
the tone of the note. However, in a typical song, there tend to be few such opportunities.
Given the somewhat severe limitations for variance of types (2) and (3), it may be
argued that Guitar Hero or Rock Band performance simply does not meet the bar
requisite for musical performance per se. However, as intended variance from the
composer’s creation tends to count against some performance as being a performance of
the work in question, it would be a very strange requirement indeed that an actual
performance of the song must allow for qualities that count against it being such a
performance. Regarding interpretive variance, as noted, Guitar Hero and Rock Band
performance allows for very little interpretation on the part of the player. When played
without error, the Guitar Hero performer will always be playing according to some other
performer’s interpretation. As such, the performer’s range of interpretation is severely
limited. Of course, the same would also seem to be true for orchestral performers. A
second violinist in the London Philharmonic Orchestra, for instance, is not at leisure to
freely interpret her role in performing Tchaikovsky’s Eugene Onegin. Rather, she is
constrained by the interpretation of the orchestra’s conductor. Although the sorts of
constraint at issue differ, if the violinist’s lack of freedom to interpret does not count
against her performance as such, it seems less than obvious that the Guitar Hero
performer’s lack of interpretive freedom should do likewise. [20] As Davies notes,
“Typically, rock pieces are conveyed through examplars, not by notations. Some
musicians read the model as literally as they are able and set out to make sound-alike
recordings. Though these might lack originality and interpretative appeal, they are of the
same work.” [21]
5. The Intentions of the Player
Although perhaps not essentially interpretive, performance is almost certainly an
intentional activity, and both Levinson and Davies build intentional aspects into their
accounts. According to Levinson, a performance of a musical work (to be distinguished
from an instance of the work) is a sound event whereby the performer intends to
instantiate the work and in which she succeeds to a reasonable degree. [22]
While it is conceivable that one might unintentionally instantiate some work—say, by
accidentally bumping up against the “play” button on a CD player—it is more difficult to
think of someone in the same way accidentally or unintentionally performing some work.
This being said, Davies notes, we can imagine a trumpeter who, due to some mislabeled
sheet music, thinks she is performing a piece by Henry Purcell but succeeds rather in
performing one by Jeremiah Clarke. In such an instance, Davies contends, we want to
say that she has performed Clarke’s piece. And although it might be said that she has
done so accidentally, her performance is not one devoid of intention. On such an
account, the sort of intention required by a performer will not be particularly robust.
Davies argues, “The performance intentions that are crucial to the identity of the
performance are low-level (play these notes as instructed) rather than high-level (play
Purcell’s piece).” [23]
Playing a game like Guitar Hero or Rock Band is likewise intentional. And, at least prima
facie, the player’s intentions are not only in line with those that Davies requires—they
are precisely those that Davies requires. That is, on a very simple level, to “play these
notes as instructed” is the object of the game. However, it may be contended, a true
performer intends to perform so that he can perform, while the Guitar Hero player
intends to perform so that he can play a game. That is, it might be argued, while a
performer can certainly have multiple intentions regarding his actions, for the event to
constitute a legitimate performance of the work in question, it must be his primary
intention (or at least among his primary intentions) that he instantiate the work. And at
least in many cases of Guitar Hero and Rock Band events, this intention is arguably
secondary to the intention of winning—or at least playing—the game. That is, the
player’s intention to perform a song is instrumental to his more primary intention of
playing the game. However, if this is the line one wants to take with regard to Guitar
Hero and the like, one will be led to similar conclusions regarding performances on such
game shows as American Idol and The X Factor, performances in battle-of-the-bands-
type events, and perhaps even performances for audition. In each of these cases, the
performers’ intentions to perform songs are instrumental and secondary to the more
primary intention of playing a game or winning a contest. And these, we suspect, while
perhaps not paradigm cases, nonetheless intuitively qualify as legitimate performances.
If the intention to play a game does not in principle exclude the legitimate intention to
perform a song, and thus a legitimate ensuing performance of the song, then Guitar
Hero and Rock Band performances cannot be excluded for such a reason.
6. Issues of Instrumentation
Perhaps the strongest objection still to be raised is that a Guitar Hero player simply isn’t
playing a guitar. He is at best playing something that bears a superficial resemblance to
a guitar. This might not be such a problem except that songs played on Guitar Hero are
generally written to be played on guitar.
Levinson, for one, builds into his understanding of what it means to be a musical work
that the work specifies particular performance means. [24] Although there are
uncommon exceptions, the great majority of Western musical works are composed as
instrument-specific ones. At least one reason to accept Levinson’s requirement in general
is that different instruments have different sonic ranges and may require different sorts
of manipulation by the performer. What is playable on one instrument may simply not be
playable on another. And even where it is possible to play some piece on an instrument
other than that specified, the work may sound distinctly different: a piece written for
harpsichord sounds different when played on piano, to say nothing of a piece written for
violin but played on saxophone. Of course, a Guitar Hero performance does not sound
unlike a performance of the song played on guitar; rather, it sounds exactly like a guitar
performance.
Given that Guitar Hero and Rock Band players use controllers and not real guitars or
drums, however, it might be contended that a Guitar Hero or Rock Band performance is
not a performance of the purported song as such, but is rather a performance of a
transcription of that work. Roughly, a transcription is a version of some given musical
work faithful to the musical content of the original but designed for play on some
instrument or instruments other than those specified for performances of the original. At
least on this description, the idea that Guitar Hero and Rock Band players are performing
transcriptions of the works in question, and not the original works, seems to have some
possible merit.
There are three kinds of songs available to Guitar Hero and Rock Band players: (1) those
originally recorded by the bands that popularized the songs; (2) cover-versions of such
popular songs recorded specifically for use with the games; and (3) those originally
written and recorded specifically for use with the games. Regardless of what those
playing the works for studio recordings intended, it might be argued that as the on-
screen notation employed by Guitar Hero and Rock Band are tied to the game controllers
and not guitar, drums, and the like, all such songs employed by these games represent
transcriptions. Davies argues:
It is a necessary condition of a musical score’s being a transcription that it
be intended as such. So, if a musical score is a transcription of a musical
work, X, it must be the intention of the producer of the score to write a
work faithful to the musical content of X while writing for and in a way
appropriate to a medium other than that for which X is written. [25]
Those who translate the musical notes of some work for Guitar Hero notation specify
play on the game controller, and not on guitar (and similarly for Rock Band play). As
such, Guitar Hero play seems in line with this condition.
However, it is likely even Davies would balk at this being sufficient for Guitar Hero
performances representing performances of transcriptions. First, when played
successfully, the sound of a Guitar Hero performance is not merely faithful to the musical
content of the original; rather it is exactly like a performance of the original. And second,
the individual responsible for translating a song’s musical notation into Guitar Hero
notation is not involved in what we would call a creative endeavor. Rather, his job
involves the simple translation of notes and chords from one graphic representation to
another, or else from an exemplar recording to a graphic representation. Davies
contends, “A transcription must depart far enough from the original to count as a distinct
piece and not merely as a copy of the original.” [26] Moreover, Davies notes, a
transcription cannot help but comment on the original. He argues:
[T]ranscription is a creative activity (in a way that recording and copying
are not). It is inevitable that the transcriber presents the musical contents
of the original from a personal perspective, although presenting them in a
way that is faithful given that those contents are filtered through a different
medium. [27]
It would be difficult to argue that the individual responsible for representing a song’s
score in Guitar Hero notation is doing so “from a personal perspective.” Once the game
designers have determined how notes and chords in general shall be represented in the
game, representing the notes and chords of any particular song seems a largely
mechanical matter. On any apparent level, Guitar Hero does not allow the player to play
a song like the original, but rather to play the original. Ultimately the question regarding
transcriptions is a question about the work being played, not how it is being played.
If there is no transcription to concern us, then, let us return to the issue of
instrumentation. Davies argues:
Suppose for the sake of this argument that its performance means is among
the work-identifying features of Bach’s Inventions and also that the modern
piano is excluded from the list of possible performance means. Knowing
this, I might still choose to play the Inventions on my piano, and it seems
reasonable to conclude that I might succeed. [28]
On Levinson’s distinction between instantiations and performances of works, a piece
performed on instruments other than those specified by the composer cannot qualify as
an instantiation, but may still qualify as a legitimate (if flawed) performance if it would
be recognized as such by a suitably informed listener.
Most commonly, such issues arise as older designs are supplanted by improvements. For
example, through an evolution of design, the modern guitar eventually supplanted the
lute. The electric guitar, however, has not so far supplanted its acoustic parent and does
not show signs of doing so any time in the foreseeable future. The synthesizer,
meanwhile, bears a similar relationship to the modern piano. They continue to exist
side-by-side, with practitioners of one also playing the other. A reasonable question to
ask, then, is if one can play a song written for lute on guitar, or one written for
harpsichord on synthesizer keyboard, and still have it qualify as a legitimate
performance, can one also legitimately play a piece written for, say, horn on
synthesizer? Modern synthesizers, after all, are capable of mimicking the sound of horns
or any other instrument with nearly perfect sonic similarity.
Here, Stan Godlovitch (upon whose arguments Davies heavily relies) points to a worrying
slippery slope. If we allow for legitimate synthesizer performances of a work specified for
horn or other instruments, why not also pre-programmed synthesizers or, for that
matter, CD players? [29] And, we can ask, if a principled break is to be found, on which
side of the line will Guitar Hero and Rock Band performances land?
Godlovitch proposes one such possible break, which we might consider in two parts: the
first, an issue of the performer’s actions, and the second an issue of his skills. First, if the
line between performance and non-performance cannot be drawn on the basis of the
player’s instrument, perhaps it can be drawn on the basis of what the performer does in
playing the instrument. After all, while the actions involved in playing a lute and those of
playing a guitar (or those of harpsichord and synthesizer) are strikingly similar, the
actions involved in playing a lute and those of playing a CD bear little to no resemblance.
While this distinction describes a difference between clearly legitimate and clearly
illegitimate performances, it does little on its own to help us decide more contestable
cases. Being a sliding scale, similarity in actions allows for countless gradations between
identity and complete dissimilarity. As such, the issue of player’s actions alone does not
seem to solve the slippery slope so much as describe it.
Godlovitch points to socially- and institutionally-ingrained reasons, however, for focusing
on the performer’s actions. What one does with one’s hands in playing the piano is a
matter of institutional convention. It is tradition, Godlovitch argues, that decides the
matter. The way that musicians perform their instruments is every bit as much a matter
of musical tradition as the instruments they play; to diverge from such traditions is to
stray from legitimacy. Let us, however, consider the case of Alvin Law. Born without
arms due to his mother’s use of thalidomide, and despite having been told his toes were
too short, Law learned to play the piano with his feet. Certainly, this falls outside
traditional convention, but do we really want to say that if he is able to play Bach’s
Inventions with his toes, no matter how well, he still cannot be said to have legitimately
performed the piece?
The second part to Godlovitch’s principled break—considered apart from the first—seems
to have greater potential. In judging issues of authentic performance, Godlovitch argues,
we should look to the skills involved in playing the instrument:
[T]he output, the result, the sound, is not all that traditionally matters in
performance. For a player to take proper credit for a performance, the
performance must display the virtues of skill and expertise exacted by
various works which professionally enabled players to perform what they
perform. [30]
Skills developed in playing guitar, piano, or any other instrument, Godlovitch contends,
give rise to proficiency, being the “target of formal education and training.” [31] Beyond
such minimal standards, however, a musician can with great effort rise to mastery and in
exceptional cases to virtuosity. Although such ranks likely do not exhibit clear boundaries
and are vulnerable to shifting, these are the rough classifications recognized by the
community of musicians. And, more so than the sliding scale of similarity in action, such
rankings are determined by community-established norms of professional
accomplishment. The rankings are meritorious: a proficient musician should be able to
play certain compositions, the master certain others, and the virtuoso still others.
Godlovitch notes:
Ceteris paribus, those who perform the more difficult works are the more
accomplished players, and that position traditionally is one that is
appropriately earned by means-testing. [32]
There simply is no skill involved in pressing “play” on a CD player. Playing Beethoven’s
Hammerklavier sonata, on the other hand, requires a virtuoso’s hands. Given the relative
amount of skill involved, programming a synthesizer to play the sonata simply cannot
qualify as a performance. As Davies notes, “Instruments can be improved, but only so
long as the change keeps intact the difference in skill separating the virtuoso from the
person who is merely competent.” [33] If some means of music-making is too
democratizing of skill, employing such a means to play a musical work cannot qualify as
a performance of the work.
Of course, recognized degrees of skill are found in all genres of music, with rock music
being no exception. While Creedence Clearwater Revival’s “Bad Moon Rising” is a
relatively simple composition to play on guitar, Joe Satriani’s “Satch Boogie” requires
nothing short of guitar mastery, and probably virtuosity. What, then, of Guitar Hero? As
noted above, Guitar Hero, ironically, does not require the player to play the guitar, nor
even to know how to play the guitar. [34] While it would thus perhaps be inaccurate to
call a Guitar Hero player a “guitarist,” given the arguments above, playing guitar or even
knowing how seems unnecessary to legitimately performing a song written for guitar.
And while bearing a passing resemblance to the fingering of a real guitar, Guitar Hero
playing involves a substantially different skill-set. Nevertheless, it is a skill-set, and we
might accurately classify players as proficient, masters, and virtuosi, with those on the
low end of the scale perhaps being able to play simpler songs on the “easy” level of the
game, and those on the high end being able to play the most difficult songs on the
“expert” level without error. “Satch Boogie” became available in 2008 for Guitar Hero
World Tour and is generally considered one of the most difficult songs to play. [35] As
new editions of the games are released and as the catalog of songs available for play
continues to expand, there is nothing to stop the makers of the games from releasing
more and more difficult tracks. Just as with any instrument, as more players become
more proficient, the bar for virtuosity will rise. After all, many classical compositions once
considered by virtuosi to be unplayable have since become performance standards and
even pedagogical tools. And so, while calling a Guitar Hero player a “guitarist” or
perhaps even a “musician” may be inaccurate, it remains unclear why they should not at
least in some cases be called “performers,” and performers of the songs in question, at
that.
7. Music Minus One
One final route is open to the skeptic regarding Guitar Hero and Rock Band performances
qualifying as performances of the songs as such: it may be argued that purported Guitar
Hero and Rock Band performances may be dealt with in the same way that Davies deals
with karaoke and Music-Minus-One recordings. [36] A karaoke recording contains
essentially a studio recording for which the lead vocal track has been omitted or
removed, and has been replaced with a visual prompter for the singer. Following the
prompts, the singer sings along with the karaoke recording. A Music-Minus-One
recording works essentially the same way, but rather than removing a vocal track, the
recording omits the input of some particular instrument. With accompanying sheet
music, the budding musician can as such play the oboe part in Stamitz’s Quartet in F
Minor or the bluegrass mandolin part for “The Ballad of Jed Clampett.” The essential
problem with such an act qualifying as a legitimate performance of some work, according
to Davies, is that in each case there are in fact two disconnected acts which, because of
their distinct ontologies,cannot be fused together as would be required of a single
performance. According to Davies, the conditions necessary for legitimate studio
performances diverge from those necessary for legitimate live performances. Allowing as
they do for multiple takes, mixing, and sound manipulation, Davies contends, studio
performances are completed “when the master version is ‘in the can,’ ready for printing
and issue.” [37] As such, what counts against the individual playing or singing along with
a disk qualifying as a performer is that the recorded performance is already complete,
and it as such cannot form a part of another performance, specifically a live one. It’s too
late to perform with the Beatles: John and George are dead. As Davies puts it, “Singing
along with a karaoke disc fosters the illusion that one is a co-performer, without making
it the case that one is.” [38] You might still perform the song but you won’t do it with a
karaoke or Music-Minus-One disk, Davies argues. You’ll need to start from scratch.
Naturally, if this presents a critical problem for the karaoke singer or Music-Minus-One
performer, the situation is all the much worse for the Guitar Hero or Rock Band player.
However, Davies’ analysis is not without its own problems.
To see the central problem, let us consider the case of pop star Justin Timberlake.
Timberlake’s studio recordings are created in the same manner as other studio rock
recordings, with separate tracks recorded for each instrument and each vocal input,
often at different times. The tracks are then mastered after the fact for the completed
performance. Although he plays keyboards and guitar, it should be noted, Timberlake
does not typically perform an instrument in live performances but rather provides only
the lead vocals for his songs. Moreover, like many such pop stars, in his live
performances Timberlake does not always employ a live band. Rather, he sometimes
employs something akin to a karaoke disk, the studio recording minus his lead vocals,
which he then supplies live. If Davies is correct, however, such performances cannot
qualify as true performances of the songs. This much seems highly counterintuitive.
Rather, it seems clear, Timberlake is very much performing his own songs in such cases.
Likewise, if Timberlake walks into a bar on karaoke night, selects the tracks of one of his
own songs and sings along with the disk, given the lack of difference between this and
many of his other live performances, it would seem strange to say he has not in fact
performed the song in this case. And if this is the case, then it seems equally strange to
say that some other singer performing the same act has failed to legitimately perform
the song.
Although we believe Davies is correct in his claim that the published recording constitutes
a finished work, [39] this does not seem to exclude the possibility of the musical tracks
also constituting parts of another distinct work, one which is not yet finished. Certainly,
parts of existing works are incorporated into new works all the time and in all media. The
difference in this case is that we are concerned primarily not with works per se, but with
performances of particular works. As discussed above, performance is almost certainly an
intentional activity. And, as Davies argues extensively, when performing a particular
song as a member of a particular group, be it a studio band or orchestra, that each
member intends to perform with the others is arguably essential to that performance as
such. [40]It may thus be contended that, in the example above, the studio band intends
to perform with Justin Timberlake, and even if Timberlake provides his live vocals to an
otherwise completed recording of the studio performance, they constitute parts of the
same performance. However, this would not seem to get us around the issue that
Timberlake is accompanied by what Davies considers a finished work. A more plausible
explanation is that, in recording their studio tracks, the studio musicians (and the
producer, who in some cases will constitute a performer) intend two things: (1) that their
recorded parts will constitute aspects of the studio performance, and (2) that their
recorded parts will also constitute aspects of a live performance, with vocals to be filled
in later. In this way, the same acts by the studio musicians will constitute parts of at
least two different and distinct performances.
While music recorded prior to the invention of AudioSynTrac recordings and the rise in
popularity of karaoke could not reasonably have been recorded with this second intention
in mind, as karaoke gained popularity and record studios began to see it as a viable
practice, such an intention would reasonably have been on the minds of studio musicians
and producers. The same would seem to be true for Music-Minus-One recordings, many
of which are originally recorded specifically for this use. Such being the case, at least
some karaoke and Music-Minus-One performances would seem to have the potential to
qualify as legitimate performances of the songs.
Although paralleling karaoke and Music-Minus-One in many respects, the additional
problem for Guitar Hero and Rock Band cases is that the recordings used are not missing
any instrument or vocal tracks. However, as discussed earlier, there are three kinds of
songs available for play on Guitar Hero and Rock Band: (1) those originally recorded by
the bands that popularized the songs; (2) cover-versions of such popular songs recorded
specifically for use with the games; and (3) those originally written and recorded
specifically for use with the games. In at least types (2) and (3), the musicians recording
the tracks intended them for use with the games. And while Davies still might present an
argument that the tracks, once mixed, mastered, and released constitute complete
works, this does not necessarily exclude the tracks’ use as parts of other performances,
specifically Guitar Hero and Rock Band performances, provided such are among the
intentions of the studio bands and producers. And, as the games continue to rise in
popularity, the intention that the recordings be used in this way may also be on the
minds of popular bands and producers recording their new songs.
8. Conclusion
At least in cases where studio recordings are made with the non-exclusive intention that
the recordings be used in Guitar Hero or Rock Band performances, and the Guitar Hero
or Rock Band player performs at expert level with minimal error, it seems, the player can
indeed be said to be legitimately performing the song in question. Naturally, we expect
that many—including Davies and Levinson—will find this conclusion unpalatable.
However, there seem then to be two possibilities: either the standard philosophical
accounts of performance are largely correct and some Guitar Hero and Rock Band
performances will qualify as true performances of the songs in question, or else the
conclusion reached in this paper points to something seriously lacking in the standard
accepted accounts of performance. If the latter, then there remains much work to be
done in building an understanding of musical performance.
The possibility of Guitar Hero and Rock Band performances qualifying as legitimate
performances of the songs in question represents a potential wedge in how we—
philosophers, musicians, and the general public—view musical performance in general.
The arts are continually evolving. More often than not, it is a relatively slow process, as
one tradition gives way to others. At times, however, the arts offer more dramatic
prospects—revolutions. Nearly a century ago, Marcel Duchamp purchased a urinal,
upended it, and signed it with a pseudonym—and forever changed how we look at the
plastic arts. Whether something represents a revolution in the arts or an artistic dead
end depends on whether it gains the sustained attention of the artistic and critical
communities, and of society at large. In this regard, the fate of such games as Guitar
Hero and Rock Band remains to be seen. In the case of Duchamp’s Fountain, it was the
attention of the artistic and critical communities that served to change how the general
public viewed art, though even now this is ongoing. If Guitar Hero and Rock Band
represent a revolution in musical performance, however, it seems that the attention of
the general public will serve to hammer the initial wedge, opening the way for the artistic
and critical communities to follow suit.
Already, Guitar Hero and Rock Band competitions are widespread. This year, MTV Games
and Harrah’s Entertainment organized a nationwide Rock Band tournament. The winners,
“The Gurnkillers,” won the opportunity to open for The B-52s at Atlantic City’s House of
Blues. [41] Is it conceivable that music students could one day be taking classes in
Guitar Hero and Rock Band? Could we one day see the release of Mozart Hero? Would
“simulated” symphonies be entitled to the same funding as “real” symphonies? Would
video game developers become viable contenders for arts funding, grants, and awards?
All of this seems to depend on whether purported performances of the type we have
been considering come to be accepted as legitimate performances on a par with
conventional means of performance.
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